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Abstract Some modals are ambiguous between epistemic and circumstantial inter-
pretations, but allow epistemic readings only when they combine with stative verb
phrases. For other modals, the epistemic reading is not so constrained. I propose a
theory of modal semantics that is sensitive to height of merge position and by exten-
sion the properties of the situational description that the modal combines with. To
capture the pattern, modals are argued to have two important dimensions of meaning:
(i) they will describe a topic situation asserted to be either an exhaustive or non-
exhaustive choice over live situational alternatives; (ii) they will either anchor that
topic situation indexically, or anaphorically. Modal meaning can then systematically
interact with situational descriptions to build different interpretations while keeping
the underlying semantics of the modal the same. Epistemic readings emerge when a
modal attaches above the height at which temporal parameters of the situation are
bound, circumstantials attach below the temporal specification. State-constrained
epistemic modals are those that have indexical anchoring properties.
Keywords: modality, epistemics, statives, choice, alternatives, situations, indexicality
1 Epistemic modality and the stativity puzzle
There are a number of well known linguistic environments where English shows a
strong state vs. event distinction, lumping together dynamic eventualities of different
telicity specifications against states (see Bohnemeyer & Swift 2004 for a classifi-
cation of English in these terms, contrasting it with telicity sensitive languages). I
briefly summarize some of these core well known facts here: (i) only states allow for
a Universal reading of the perfect, where the eventuality is interpreted as continuing
from a past time up to and possibly including the speech time (see Portner 2003); (ii)
only states allow an ongoing at speech time interpretation for the present tense, while
events require the progressive for the ongoing reading and get habitual readings in
the present tense (Dowty 1979); (iii) in discourse sequencing, dynamic eventualities
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in English are non-overlapping (tending to advance the topic time), while states
produce overlapping predications with the previously mentioned eventuality (see
Kamp & Rohrer 1983 for Romance). Thus, English shows robust language internal
evidence for a split between stative and dynamic eventualities which affects their
temporal interpretation in systematic ways. It is relevant to note that with respect
to these tests, both progressives and perfects pattern as states in English (see also
Hallman 2010), while passives pattern as dynamic events.
In this paper, I add the following novel empirical observation stated in (1) to this
set of stativity sensitive phenomena in English:
(1) Epistemic Stative-Sensitive (ESS) Modals:
ESS Modals are those that are technically ambiguous between an epistemic
and circumstantial interpretation, but can only get that epistemic interpretation
when combined with a stative prejacent.
An example of an ESS Modal, must, is shown in (2) below, where the epistemic
reading only emerges with stative prejacents.
(2) a. Eeyore must be sad/in the field. (epistemic or obligational (future-oriented))
b. Eeyore must go to Christopher Robin’s party. (only obligational)
An example of a non-ESS Modal, might, is shown in (3). Here, the epistemic reading
is always available, regardless of the aktionsart of the prejacent.
(3) a. Eeyore might be sad/in the field. (epistemic (present or future))
b. Eeyore might go to Christopher Robin’s party. (epistemic (present))
Another way of putting the generalization is in terms of the orientation of the modal
anchor, in the sense of Condoravdi (2002): in the case of ESS Modals, the possibility
of an epistemic reading correlates with the present orientation of the modal anchor,
while in the non-ESS Modal it does not.
If we combine modals with different varieties of prejacent (i.e. VPs of different
types), we find that the possibility of an epistemic reading comes and goes pre-
dictably. If we consider the modal must below, we see that stative lexical verbs,
statives formed with be and an AP or PP, progressives, perfects and habitual inter-
pretations of dynamic verbs all allow epistemic interpretations side by side with the
deontic must reading. Episodic readings of non-stative verbs (whether activities,
accomplishments or achievements), and the eventive passive VP only give rise to a
deontic reading under must. See the examples in (4).
(4) a. John must like brussel sprouts very much! STATIVE LEXICAL
Readings: epistemic (present); deontic
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b. John must really hate getting up early! STATIVE LEXICAL VERB
Readings: epistemic (present); deontic
c. John must be in his office/tired. BE + PP/AP
Readings: epistemic (present); deontic
d. John must be running the marathon (right now). PROGRESSIVE
Readings: epistemic (present/future); deontic
e. John must have seen that movie already. PERFECT
Readings: epistemic (past); deontic
f. John must work hard for a living. HABITUAL
Readings: epistemic (present); deontic (future)
g. John must run to the store. DYNAMIC ACTIVITY
Readings: deontic (future)
h. John must build a very big house. DYNAMIC ACCOMPLISHMENT
Readings: deontic (future)
i. John must win the race. DYNAMIC ACHIEVEMENT
Readings: deontic (future)
j. John must be arrested/be chased by the police. PASSIVE
Readings: deontic (future)
The reader can verify for him/herself that the negated English modal can’t,
which also allows both epistemic and circumstantial readings (this time the latter is
a permission deontic or ability modal) shows the same split in the data: sentences
corresponding to (4a)-(4f) are ambiguous between epistemic and circumstantial
readings, while (4g)-(4j) allow only the circumstantial.1 Another modal which
seems to pattern this way is the so-called future auxiliary will, for which we can
also distinguish two distinct readings: one is the future reading, which I will assume
with Copley 2002 is a circumstantial modal reading, and the other is an inferential
reading, which is a form of epistemic modality. (Don’t try calling John, he will be on
the train now. (inferential) vs. John will be on the first train tomorrow (prediction)).
The relevant observation is that here too, the inferential reading disappears with
non-stative prejacents.
The epistemic readings are essentially readings that concern the speaker’s knowl-
edge state at the present moment, while the circumstantial modal readings quantify
1 It is a bizarre quirk of English can that the epistemic reading is not available in its positive polarity
version. I have no explanation for this, but I note that like other negative polarity items the epistemic
reading is also licensed with can used in a yes-no question. The reader can check that if the positive
yes-no question versions of (4a)-(4j) above are constructed, the same pattern of epistemic readings
emerges. The fact that this pattern tracks the must pattern, following neatly the independent epistemic
licensing quirk of can, shows that the epistemic reading itself is a conditioning factor.
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over future oriented events. In the patterns we have seen above, the epistemic read-
ings arise only from stative or derived stative predications, while the circumstantial
readings are possible with both events and states.
On the other hand, the epistemic readings of other modals such as might, should
and could do not seem to care about the stativity of the prejacent complement, as
the following examples for might show, as in (5). Once again the reader is invited to
verify that the corresponding pattern holds for should and could as well.
(5) a. John might like brussel sprouts very much! STATIVE LEXICAL
Readings: epistemic (present/future)
b. John might really hate getting up early! STATIVE LEXICAL VERB
Readings: epistemic (present/future)
c. John might be in his office/tired. BE + PP/AP
Readings: epistemic (present/future)
d. John might be running the marathon right now. PROGRESSIVE
Readings: epistemic (present/future)
e. John might have seen that movie already. PERFECT
Readings: epistemic (past)
f. John might work hard for a living. HABITUAL
Readings:epistemic (present/future)
g. John might run to the store. DYNAMIC ACTIVITY
Readings: epistemic (future)
h. John might build a very big house. DYNAMIC ACCOMPLISHMENT
Readings: epistemic (future)
i. John might win the race. DYNAMIC ACHIEVEMENT
Readings: epistemic (future)
j. John might be arrested/be chased by the police. PASSIVE
Readings: epistemic (future)
The generalization is as follows: modals such as should, could and might allow
an epistemic reading even for dynamic verbs (non-ESS Modals), but modals like
must, will or can only allow an epistemic reading for states (ESS modals). Thus
the choice of modal base is influenced by the aspectual properties of the prejacent
for ESS type modals only. For a modal like must in English, an epistemic modal
base is only available if the prejacent is a state, while eventive prejacents give rise to
a circumstantial modal base. This generalization requires interpreting the perfect
tense in English as a kind of derived state, following Parsons (1990) and Kamp &
Reyle (1993), and indeed it patterns with states with respect to the diagnostics shown
earlier. Past evaluation time of the prejacent event is only possible with perfects in
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English, but this is consistent with the intepretation of the epistemic quantification
as over present knowledge states of the speaker (see Hacquard 2007), if the perfect
denotes a derived resultant state with implications for the past instantiation of the
event proper. Under this view, the progressive is also a derived state (as has been
argued recently in Hallman 2010), as is the habitual.
The use of the term stative to pick out the critical natural class for must, is of
course already an interpretation of the facts. For those who remain sceptical, I offer
a purely morphosemantic alternative description of the generalization: for Type
I modals like must, if the (possibly derived) verbal prejacent could possibly have
occurred felicitously with the English simple present tense, then it can also get an
epistemic reading with that modal. Here’s the bottom line. Epistemic must, can’t and
will have the same distributional fingerprint as the simple present tense in English.
Epistemic might, should and could do not.
Thus, the data pattern here presents us with a couple of analytical problems
that we would like to solve. Firstly, we would like to have a constrained theory of
modal compositional interpretation that combines with an analysis of stativity so as
to derive the distribution of epistemic interpretations shown above. Secondly, we
need an account of the role of the specific modal lexical contribution in delivering
this result, given that not all modals are ESS Modals.
2 Background on modal compositional interpretation
Following the foundational work of Kratzer (1981) etc., modals in natural language
have been claimed to be lexically distinguished with respect to a number of different
dimensions: (i) quantificational force, i.e. universal vs. existential; (ii) constraints
on the type of modal base they are compatible with; (iii) nature of the preferential
ordering relations among members of the modal base. Hacquard 2006, and subse-
quent papers have already made an important and influential proposal extending the
Kratzerian system to account for generalizations at the syntax-semantics interface.
In particular, Hacquard is at pains to reconcile the elegance of the Kratzerian system
where a single underspecified meaning can handle both epistemic and root inter-
pretations, with the results of linguistic typology (cartography) which suggest the
generalization that epistemic readings attach higher in the clause, outside tense, and
root meanings attach inside tense. She proposes a system which ties particular types
of interpretation to height in the structure. Her idea is to replace the base world from
which the modal base is calculated with an event instead, and relate the semantic
differences to differences in event anchoring, which is sensitive to the height of the
modal in question. Specifically, she claims: (i) when the modal is speaker-oriented,
it is keyed to the speech time and receives an epistemic interpretation; (ii) when
the modal is attitude holder-oriented, it is keyed to the attitude time and receives an
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epistemic interpretation: (iii) when the modal is subject-oriented, it is keyed to the
time provided by tense and receives a root interpretation. Hacquard otherwise keeps
intact the central structure of the Kratzerian solution: modals are functions from sets
of possible worlds to sets of possible worlds; a restriction via contextually defined
modal bases, ordering sources, existential vs. universal quantification. However,
as it stands, the Hacquard account does not allow us either to understand the state
sensitivity of the epistemic reading, or to distinguish between ESS and non-ESS
modals in a principled way.
In other words, why does the epistemic reading go away in (6) but not in (7)?
(6) a. John must be in his office.
b. John must go to the party.
(7) a. John might be in his office.
b. John might go to the party.
To capture the core intuition behind the generalization, I will explore a rather
different model for modal interpretation that makes the modals themselves more
like tense in a certain respect: both modals and tense predicates will be argued to
combine with situational descriptions to create richer, modified situation descrip-
tions. Secondly, I will shift some of the work done by the contextual component in
classical theories into the compositional semantics directly. The interpretation of
the modal will be directly sensitive to height via the properties of its complement
(the constituent it combines with), as opposed to via the accessibility of different
event binders for contextual variables, as in Hacquard’s account. Perhaps the most
radical part of the analysis will be the shift in semantic force of the modal itself that
the compositional account necessitates. Specifically, I will argue that modals should
be seen as operators over situational alternatives, involving the notion of CHOICE
as a primitive notion, and relativized to a TOPIC for the choice. The contextual
component will remain in the explication of the GROUNDS for the choice in question,
which will be the placeholder for all the semantic work currently done by modal
bases and ordering sources.
Essentially, in trying to solve the problem at the syntax-semantics interface, I
am forced to rethink the balance between the relative contributions of structure vs.
lexical presuppositional information and contextual information.
3 Modals as choices over situational ‘alternatives’
The standard conception of tense and modality is that the former category is a
relation between times/intervals (the topic time and the utterance time) and that the
latter is a quantifier over possible worlds.
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(8) a. [[ must α ]]w = 1 iff [[ α ]]w′ for all w′ that are accessible from w.
b. [[ past α ]]t = 1 iff [[ α ]]t ′ for some t′ that precedes t.
Departing from the standard conception, I will follow Kratzer (2008) in claiming that
propositions are not sets of possible worlds, but are rather characteristic functions
(sets of) of situations. Situations are the key variable that all propositional operators
modify equally.
Note that situations have time and location parameters and belong to particular
possible worlds in this system. They are smaller and more specific than worlds, and
have no transworld reality except via the ‘counterpart’ relation of Lewis (1986).
“. . . sentences are built from smaller constituents with propo-
sitional contents and that tenses, as well as temporal and locative
adverbials, can be uniformly analysed as propositional operators
successively imposing constraints on the situations that are being
described. .... Tenses and temporal operators do no longer describe,
refer to, or quantify over times. Situations have taken the place of
times. The meaning assignments for past and present I gave earlier
reflected this ‘timeless’ perspective on tenses.” (Kratzer 2008: 47-48)
To give a concrete example, the reinterpreted tense predicates from Kratzer are given
below.
(9) a. [[ past ]]c = λpλ s[ s ≈ spast,c & p(s)]
where spast,c is the unique situation s such that s≤in fPast(sc) and s is a topic
situation at sc. Undefined if there is no such situation.
b. [[ present ]]c = λpλ s[ s ≈ spresent,c & p(s)]
where spresent,c is the unique situation s such that s≤in fNow(sc) and s is a
topic situation at sc. Undefined if there is no such situation.
Similarly, we could also model modal operators as quantifying directly over situa-
tions instead of the possible world parameter directly. Kratzer argues that if modals
truly quantified over the world variable alone it should be possible to find modal
operators that quantified over the world variable of a world, time, location triple
while keeping the place and/or time intact. She argues that no such modals exist,
so the variables cannot be independent of each other, and shows how the modal
interpretations can be rewritten in terms of situational variables. While I will not
adopt the specific Kratzer style denotations for modals, the move to situations will
be an important component in the analysis, because it allows temporal and modal
operators to combine with entities of the same denotational sort without failure of
compositionality, while still allowing differences between situational descriptions
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Fin
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Situations
Events
Figure 1 Mapping between syntactic height and semantic sort
that will feed different final interpretations. I will postpone the proposal for the
actual modal denotations until the next section.
Given the typological linguistic generalizations linking phrase structural height
to interpretation, we also need to establish how the semantics matches up to the
syntax in a systematic way. Once complex sortal entities such as situations are
granted in the semantic ontology, we can use entities of different sortal complexity
to track the denotational properties of the functional sequence, under the assumption
that the syntax builds descriptions of increasingly complex sortal units. The recent
theory of Ramchand & Svenonius (in press) proposes specifically that the lowest,
first phase of the extended verbal projection builds event descriptions; the middle
inflectional zone embodies a sortal shift to situational descriptions, and the highest
CP zone denotes descriptions of situations that are anchored (by establishing some
concrete relation to the Kaplanian context, or utterance situation). The functional
sequence and its mapping to semantic sorts is shown in Fig. 1 below.
The notion of a topic situation being anchored to a context situation is a straight-
forward extension of neo-Reichenbachian theories of tense/aspect whereby a refer-
ence time or topic time (see Klein 1994 and Demirdache & Uribe-Etxebarria 2008)
is the intermediary between the utterance time and the event.
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TP
Topic SituationT
Utterance Situation
Figure 2 TP as the locus of generalized situational anchoring
Under this view, the T head combines with a situational description (the Topic
situation) and establishes a relationship between it and the utterance situation (see
Figure 2). I will call this anchoring, and assume that tense relationships are just one
possible instantiation of the anchoring relation (see Ritter & Wiltschko 2009).
In fact, the notion of utterance situation needs to be generalized to anchor
situation to accommodate embedded attitudes and indirect discourse. I will assume
that in general, an utterance has truth conditions only once it has been anchored,
i.e. the situational description is embedded in the world via the utterance context c.
There are no propositions until we get to this point, only situational descriptions of
more or less specificity. I will use the notion of support of a situational description s
in a context c to correspond to propositional assertion in the classical sense.
(10) [[ C ]]g,c = λP∃s[P(s) & c supports s ]
which means that the context c is an information state that entails the truth of
a situation s with the descriptive content P.
In what follows, I will also use the * notation to indicate the parameters in the
anchoring context c, t* = anchor time and w* = anchor world. Under normal matrix
conditions, this will simply be the utterance time, and the actual world respectively,
but I assume that this can be relativized to deal with embedded attitudes and free
indirect discourse.
3.1 Live Alternatives
Alternatives are needed in the explication of natural language in the domains of focus,
calculation of implicatures and interrogative sentences (Rooth 1985, Rooth 1992,
Hamblin 1973, Ramchand 1997), and possibly also for certain kinds of indefinites
(Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002). They have also been used recently to understand
disjunction under modals, and in analyzing imperatives (Aloni 2007). Having said
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that, the nature of the alternatives that I need for my CHOICE predicates will be
somewhat different from the kinds of alternatives that have been explored in the
literature so far. Specifically, these are not going to be propositional alternatives, but
alternative situational descriptions.
As far as semantic compositionality is concerned, the modal combines directly
with a constituent that denotes a situational description of some sort. Thus, under this
architecture, the semantic value of the complement of the modal is just a situational
description (let us call it s1 for convenience). The situation that the modal combines
with has some properties and qualities specified, and others as yet undetermined.
Suppose Live Alternative situations are constructed by filling in the different possible
values for the parameters of the situation that are left unresolved up to that point,
and which, for the speaker, are still technically ‘live’, or ‘in play’ (ALT(s1)). (This
idea is similar to the Internal Alternatives of Greenberg 2013 in the sense that it is an
internal contextual variable that is being filled in.) Suppose then that what the modal
asserts is that the situational description constructed so far belongs to the set of Live
Alternatives constructed in this way. The proposal here takes seriously the idea
that modal assertions are made from a background of uncertainty, where there are a
number of different potential ways the world could be, but the speaker is making a
choice among them (possibly for a variety of different reasons and purposes).
(11) [[ Modal ]]g,c = λPλx∃s1[P(s1) & s1 is a CHOICE for x in c],
where s1 ∈ ALT(s1)
and ALTERNATIVE SEMANTIC VALUE (ALT(s1)) = {s : s is a live alterna-
tive for s1, created by substituting different values for the free contextual
parameters of the situational description of s. }
Now at this point, it may be objected that the notion of ‘live’ alternative is
simply a replacement for the notion of possible world which is not philosophically
or ontologically any simpler than the traditional way of thinking about things. I
agree. The problem is not with the notion of possibility (which is obscure but
uncontrovertibly real for any natural language semantics), but with its scope and
constrained relation to the syntax. Possible worlds simply get into the picture
too late for the modal base to be systematically sensitive to syntactic height in a
compositional way. Helping myself to situational descriptions allows a number of
architectural changes that are crucial to the implementation at the syntax semantics
interface—it allows the space of possibilities in terms of worlds and times to be
confined within a situational description, and be sensitive to the ways in which that
situational description has already been constructed. Secondly, it allows the notion
of ‘live’ alternative to manipulate not just world parameters, but also temporal and
polarity properties of the constructed situation. A full exposition of the power of
CHOICE combined with Live Alternatives is beyond the scope of this short paper. I
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will confine myself to what is necessary to show how it solves the analytic problem
described in the first section of this paper, and leave the further implications of the
idea to future work.
Live Alternatives are those that are intuitively logically still in play at the time
of utterance/anchor situation. I will assume that alternatives always include polar
alternatives to the event predicate (see also Aloni 2007). With respect to the time
parameter, past times are considered to be not in play any more—they are decided
in the sense of Werner (2006) and only present and future time choices for the t
parameter are eligible. I will assume that temporal alternatives are calculated with
respect to a time variable t0, which is the one that will be anchored to tense. This is
my way of implementing the future orientedness of Live Alternatives with respect to
the time variable that is eventually modified by tense. It is essentially a stipulation
about what it means to be a Live Alternative—something I take to be a primitive in
this system.2 Similiarly, counterfactual worlds, worlds known to be counterfactual at
the time of the anchor situation, cannot be part of the the alternative semantic value.
In epistemic contexts, the modal attaches after the time parameter has been set.
This restricts the alternatives to a particular time. Live Alternatives are thus going to
be things that are still in play at that time. This is just going to be the existence or
non-existence of the event described in P.
The topic of the CHOICE must be another argument of the CHOICE relation.
Something can be a choice for x if it is part of the things x is able to do, is allowed
to do, or is logically possible for x to do. The important thing is that the choices
are relativized to the involvement of x. In circumstantial modals, this x argument is
usually the highest or external argument of the event in the situational description,
but it can also be other arguments or even filled in contextually. In epistemic modals,
the x argument is the attitude holder, and the choices are inferential choices. As in
theories such as Hacquard 2006, the filling of this argument position is constrained
by syntactic height.
Finally, universal vs. existential force for the modals is transformed in this
system, so that it looks quite different but basically has the same effect. The so-
called universal modals have an exhaustive semantics for the CHOICE relation
between the ordinary semantic value and the alternative semantic value (s1 is the
only choice for x in c). The so-called existential modals have a non-exhaustive
semantics for the CHOICE relation between the ordinary semantic value and the
alternative-semantic value (s1 is one choice for x in c).
2 In other implementations, such as Condoravdi 2002, the temporal futurity of the event time with
respect to the perspective time is also simply stipulated for root modality. My own stipulation is a
slight improvement in the sense that it derives in part from modal height, although the definition of
what it means for something to be a live alternative is still axiomatic.
112
Stativity and present tense epistemics
4 Size matters
4.1 Circumstantial modality
I illustrate first with the modal have-to on its deontic interpretation as shown in (12).
(12) Mary has to go to the party.
To get the circumstantial reading, the modal merges with AspP, which denotes
a property of situations (which I am claiming have both temporal and world pa-
rameters) which is specified to embed the event e denoted by the vP. Even though
situations have time and world variables, unlike events, these parameters are unbound
at this stage.
Here’s the denotation of have-to3.
(13) [[ have-to ]]g,c = λPλx∃s1e1,t1,w1[P(s1) & s1 is the only CHOICE for x in c],
where s1 ∈ ALT(s1)
and ALTERNATIVE SEMANTIC VALUE (ALT(s1) )= {s : s = se,t,w , where
alternative values of e are e1 and not-e1, alternative values of t are t ≥ t0, and
w ranges over possible worlds.}
(The variable t0 is the one that will be later anchored by tense.)
Higher up the tree, the temporal parameter t0 will be bound by the assertion, and
the modal will be relativized to the temporal anchoring of the matrix clause, as in
Hacquard 2006.
(14) a. Mary has to go to the party.
t0 = t*, and the situational alternatives are in the future of the utterance
time.
b. Mary had to go to the party.
t0 ≤ t* , i.e. a specific moment/interval in the past of t* , and the situational
alternatives are in the future of that time.
3 I am assuming that the variable for the individual x, who is the topic for the choice situation, is going
to be filled by an argument of the event predicate in the normal case, but also sometimes by a general
topic situational variable in other cases. The examples below show that the choice of x is not fully
determined by the syntax.
(i) Mary has to go to the party.
(ii) Mary has to be in bed by 11 at the latest! (to the babysitter)
(iii) There has to be silence in the house when I am thinking!
A discussion of this aspect of the modal semantics is beyond the scope of this paper.
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There is obvious room in these definitions for different presupposed information
or pragmatic contextual information about GROUNDS for why the topic for the
choice situation has the choice he/she/it does. This framework is not intended to
replace the contextual input to modal semantics. The contextuality of modal bases
etc., has been relegated to the filling in of the notion GROUNDS for a choice, and
can be made explicit by use of adverbials or retrieved from the context.
(15) Grounds for CHOICE coming from discourse context:
A: Oh no, I have a meeting at 9 a.m. tomorrow morning!
B. Then, you will have to get up before 8 for once.
(16) Grounds for CHOICE coming from adverbial modification:
a. If you want to make that meeting, you will have to get up before 8.
b. Because of the 9 a.m. meeting, she had to get up before 8 for once.
c. In view of my schedule tomorrow, I will have to get up before 8 for once.
The point here is not to deny the work done by contextual factors, but to change
the architecture so that we get the kind of mapping between the syntax and semantics
that will allow us to integrate modality more naturally with temporal interpretation.
I do not see that the questions raised in this framework are any more difficult or
different from the equivalent issues in more standard treatments.
4.2 Epistemic modality
Things are different when we consider what happens when we place the modal
higher up in the clausal structure. If we base generate have-to higher than T, we get
the meaning shown in (17).
(17) [[ have-to ]]g,c = λPλx∃s1e1,t1,w1[P(s1) & s1 is the only CHOICE for x in c],
where s1 ∈ ALT(s1)
and ALTERNATIVE SEMANTIC VALUE ALT(s1) = {s : s = se,t1,w1 , where
alternative values of e are e1 and not-e1.}
Here the assumption is that the modal combines with the situational description after
the time and world parameters have been specified (as t1 and w1 respectively in the
above formula). Thus, the alternatives involve only the polarity of the event. The
speaker is asserting that the current context c, supports only the positive polarity
version of the situational description. Because they are making the claim both that
the context supports ALT-s1 as live alternatives in principle, while simultaneously
saying that only s1 is supportable, this makes the assertion of must modality both
more explicit about actual choosing than an ordinary utterance of s1, and more
indirect in asserting the truth of the prejacent (see von Fintel & Gillies 2010).
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5 Modals and anchoring
I have proposed a semantics that makes the epistemic vs. circumstantial readings of
modals and their temporal properties follow from the height of attachment and the
semantics of choice over live situational alternatives. Now it remains to account for
the differences between must and might when it comes to the distribution of their
epistemic readings. The difference here comes from anchoring properties of the
modals in question.
Modals in English all behave distributionally as if they end up high in the clause:
they invert in questions, they precede negation and do not require do-support, and
they are unique in the clause. I take these facts at face value and assume that,
wherever the modal is actually base generated, it actually always ends up in the
equivalent of Infl. What we assume from tense is that it is the job of this head to
establish a relationship between the topic situation stop and the situational anchor
of the clause s∗. The natural assumption then is that modals also must be endowed
with information that establishes such a relationship. I assume moreover that this
anchoring property of Infl, suitably generalized, is a universal property of natural
language sentences, plausibly driven by constraints at the interpretational interface
(Ritter & Wiltschko 2009)
(18) Generalized Anchoring (Informal):
I will assume that the topic situation must be anchored in some way to the
utterance/anchor situation to make a well-formed utterance. A well formed
utterance therefore always takes the logical form: c supports s.
The idea here is that modals like must share a property with the present tense in
being indexically bound to the utterance time. The anchoring difference between
modals such as must and might is between INDEXICAL and ANAPHORIC, as defined
in (19).4
(19) INDEX: s = s*. The situational variable is identified directly with the deictic
anchor, the utterance situation.
ANAPHORIC: s must have its reference resolved anaphorically, either by
binding from something in the linguistic context, or to some purely discourse
contextual topic situation.
4 The idea that modals in some sense do the same job as tense has echoes in the proposal found in
Iatridou 2000 (see also Isard 1974) that past tense morphology is not a primitive tense category,
but is one of the manifestations of the more general semantic category (REMOTE, in their terms).
According to Iatridou (2000), the remote relation can relate worlds as well as times, accounting for
some cases of past morphology on modals. Apart from the use of situations as variables, my proposal
is different from Iatridou’s in that I take INDEXICAL vs. ANAPHORIC to be the primary relational
distinction, not IDENTITY vs. REMOTE.
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Note that anaphoric reference in this sense covers many different modes of reference
resolution (being essentially negative); it is intended to mirror the cut in the pronoun
system between indexical forms like I/you on the one hand, and non-indexical ones
like he/she/it on the other, regardless of the means of reference assignment of the
latter. It is well known that this is the cut that is almost universally instantiated
crosslinguistically within pronoun systems.
Thus, in addition to its semantics of CHOICE constrained by alternatives, must
also possesses information that anchors the situational description to the utterance
situation by asserting an identity between the time and world variables of that
situation with the utterance contextual ones, much like the English present tense (see
20).
(20) [[ must ]]g,c = λxλP∃s1e1,t∗,w∗[P(s1) & s1 is the only CHOICE for x in c],
where s1 ∈ ALT(s1)
and ALTERNATIVE SEMANTIC VALUE ALT(s1) = {s : s = se,t∗,w∗ , where
alternative values of e are e1 and not-e1.}
On the other hand, might is not indexical in this sense, but anaphoric, and the
temporal and world variables may be anaphorically resolved to a salient discourse
interval, or identified with some linguistically present time via binding.
(21) [[ might ]]g,c = λxλP∃s1e1,t1,w1[P(s1) & s1 is one CHOICE for x in c],
where s1 ∈ ALT(s1)
and ALTERNATIVE SEMANTIC VALUE ALT(s1) = {s : s = se,t1,w1, where
alternative values of e are e1 and not-e1.}
Thus, for might, even though it is epistemic in the sense of being about polarity
alternatives alone, it is not confined to alternatives at the utterance time or world,
since the situational parameters can be chosen pragmatically to be identical to some
discourse salient at-issue time or world.
We can now answer the question of why the epistemic version of must is confined
to stative complements. Notice that the denotation built up above includes the
denotation for present tense (by assumption, the very same present tense found in
simple clauses in English). However, we know that the English present tense is
special in requiring a stative complement. In some sense it does not matter how we
implement the semantic reason for this, as long as the reason is based directly on
the denotation that the present tense and the epistemic reading given above have
in common. However, I will assume a concrete explanation for this fact, directly
building on Taylor (1977)’s original intuition:
(22) Events vs. States (inspired by Taylor 1977): (i) If α is a stative predicate,
then α(x) is true at an interval I just in case α(x) is true at all moments within
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I; (ii) If α is an eventive predicate, then α(x) is only true at an interval larger
than a moment.
We now simply assume that this applies to the temporal parameter of situations in
our sense: situations that have a point in time as their temporal parameter, can only
embed states.
6 Extensions
The observant reader will have noticed that the non-ESS modals are the ones which
host moribund tense morphology, and the ESS Modals by and large do not. One of
the upshots of this paper has been to notice that the morphological facts of English
modals, far from being historical detritus, actually do correspond to a systematic dif-
ference in the way in which the modal is integrated into the compositional semantics
with respect to situational anchoring.
On the other hand, the negative specification of the anaphoric modals (the ones
with moribund past tense morphology) is actually a very weak specification. All
it does is refuse to identify the situational variable indexically, leaving it free to
be resolved contextually. This is the reason why we cannot simply get away with
specifying these modals as carrying a REMOTE feature with respect to the world
variable, as in the system of Iatridou (2000). The problem is that empirically, there
does not seem to be any problem with contextual binding of the outermost situational
variable to a world time pair that overlaps with the present utterance time or is
immediately subsequent to it, as in (23) below.
(23) John might/could be in his office now.
On the other hand, the idea that the situation variables must be resolved anaphorically
when might/could is used, allows the resolution to target a situation that temporally
overlaps with the utterance situation as a matter of contingent fact. Again, while
this seems to be a very weak meaning for a modal, empirically might and could do
indeed have this range of meanings, and pinning down the temporal anchoring more
than this gives the wrong results.
However, there are other contexts where the anaphoric anchoring properties of
might-like modals have an effect. Consider the following data. In the sentences in
(24), the perspectival anchor for the modal interpretation is shifted to be identical
with the event expressed in the matrix.
(24) a. John said that Mary could borrow his horse.
b. John said that Mary might borrow his horse.
c. John said that Mary should borrow his horse.
117
Ramchand
d. John said that Mary would borrow his horse.
Crucially here, we can get an interpretation where the modal calculation is based
on alternatives that fan out from the time of John’s saying. In particular, these
sentences are true if Mary indeed borrowed John’s horse and has already returned it
at the actual time of the speaker’s utterance. Compare this with the corresponding
sentences that embed indexical modals, as seen in (25).
(25) a. John said that Mary can borrow his horse.
b. John said that Mary may borrow his horse.
c. John said that Mary must borrow his horse.
d. John said that Mary will borrow his horse.
To my ear, the versions with indexical modals are good only under a kind of double
access reading—the borrowing of the horse event is in the future both of the saying
event and the speech time. This follows under my proposal because, for non-ESS
modals the temporal parameters of the choice situation can be dependent on the
main clause parameters, and anaphorically bound. For ESS modals, the temporal
parameters of the choice situation must be identified with the clausal anchoring
parameters.
The second phenomenon where the difference between indexicality and discourse
or anaphoric binding can show up is in the expression of counterfactuality. There is
a class of modal sentences in English which show an interesting ambiguity that has
been the topic of some recent work in the literature (Condoravdi 2002, Stowell 2004,
Demirdache & Uribe-Etxebarria 2008). The phenomenon concerns the readings that
arise when a modal embeds a perfect auxiliary. Consider the sentence in (26), which
is claimed to have at least two, and possibly three different readings.
(26) John could have won the race.
a. . . . let’s go and find out. (Epistemic reading)
b. . . . but he didn’t in the end. (Counterfactual reading)
c. . . . (still) at that point. (Backshifted or metaphysical reading)
Accounts in Condoravdi 2002, Stowell 2004, Demirdache & Uribe-Etxebarria 2008
all analyse the counterfactual reading as involving a scope reversal between PAST
and modal (either in the syntax or the semantics).
But reversals overgenerate, empirically. The heart of the problem is that not all
modals actually show the ambiguity; specifically, there are modals that allow only
the epistemic reading and not the backshifted one, as in (27).
(27) a. John must have won the race. Epistemic only
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b. John will have won the race. Epistemic only
c. Can John have won the race? Epistemic only
(28) a. John could have won the race. Counterfactual/backshifting possible
b. John might have won the race. Counterfactual/backshifting possible
c. John should have won the race. Counterfactual/backshifting possible
The epistemic uncertainty reading is straightforwardly predicted under the present
account by allowing the perfect tense to denote a resultant state, and anchoring the
epistemic alternatives to the utterance context. But how do the other two readings
emerge and why are readings (25b) and (25c) only possible with the anaphoric
modals in my terms? Once again the pattern is explicable under the view that
for non-ESS modals, the temporal parameters of the chosen situation can be a
counterfactual world (counterfactual reading), or past time (back shifted reading).
For ESS modals, the temporal parameters of the chosen situation must be identified
with the speech time. In the above cases the prejacent is a perfect auxiliary phrase,
which, as we saw above, patterns with statives in describing a resultant stative
situation with entailments about past time events.
7 Conclusion
To summarize, our puzzle concerning the syntax-semantics interface has caused
us to shift and repackage traditional modal semantics into a new form. Modals
have been argued to have two important dimensions of meaning: (i) they describe
a topic situation asserted to be either an exhaustive or non-exhaustive choice over
live situational alternatives; (ii) they either anchor that topic situation indexically, or
anaphorically. This allows modal meaning to systematically interact with situational
descriptions to build different interpretations while keeping the underlying semantics
of the modal the same. Epistemic readings emerge when a modal attaches above the
height at which temporal parameters of the situation are bound, circumstantials attach
below the temporal specification. State-constrained epistemic modals are those that
have indexical anchoring properties. The radical shift in the semantics of modals
is not justified by any claimed superiority in accounting for truth conditions, but in
providing a superior account of generalizations at the syntax-semantics interface.
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